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In reply to Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Response, Do We Care Enough About 
Racial Inequality?  Reflections on The River Runs Dry, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
PENNumbra 119 (2009), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/ 
12-2009/Charles.pdf; Girardeau A. Spann, Response, Doctrinal  
Dilemma, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 129 (2009), http:// 
www.pennumbra.com/responses/12-2009/Spann.pdf. 
 
The prime target of my analysis in The River Runs Dry:  When Title 
VI Trumps State Anti–Affirmative Action Laws1 is the false assumption 
that “‘affirmative action–less’ admissions policies and plunging minor-
ity admissions are the inevitable outcome of compliance with state an-
ti–affirmative action laws.”2
This Article has two central conclusions.  First, it concludes that state an-
ti–affirmative action laws do not prohibit race-conscious policies used for 
the purpose of remedying unjustified racial disparities in admissions.  
Second, the Article establishes that whether such racial disparities in 
admissions are legally justifiable under Title VI hinges on a normative as-
sessment—whether SAT scores accurately reflect the college perfor-
mance ability of minority applicants who apply to selective public univer-
sities.  A major implication of these conclusions is that, although 
frequently accused of illegally favoring minorities using “under the ta-
ble” affirmative action, affirmative action-less universities are admitting 
so few minorities that the racial disparities in admissions to those institu-
  As I explain in the introduction, 
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tions establishes a rebuttable legal presumption of a Title VI disparate 
impact violation.
3
The River Runs Dry analyzes admissions rates to the top-ranked 
public universities in the two states that have operated under state an-
ti–affirmative action laws the longest:  California and Washington.  It 
shows that there have been racial disparities in admissions to such in-
stitutions—African American and Latino applicants have been admit-
ted at consistently lower rates than white applicants—and that those 
disparities have been sufficiently large to make out a prima facie case 
of race discrimination under the disparate impact regulations of Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
 
4  The River Runs Dry also explains 
that the text of current state anti–affirmative action laws prohibits 
“discrimination” and “preferential treatment” on the basis of race,5 
but—contrary to what is often assumed—such laws are not complete 
bans on race-consciousness or race-based affirmative action.  In the 
article, I suggest that race-based affirmative action in selective admis-
sions may be legal under anti–affirmative action laws if undertaken to 
remedy racial discrimination, or, more specifically, to comply with 
Title VI disparate impact law.  This is because state courts may decide 
that considering race to avoid race discrimination either is not a “ra-
cial preference” or constitutes racially preferential treatment that is 
legally permissible under the “federal funding exception” to anti–
affirmative action laws.6
In his response to The River Runs Dry, Professor Girardeau Spann 
describes my argument as “both analytically sound and enticingly 
clever.”
 
7  Nevertheless, he suggests that it might be subject to a “po-
tentially fatal flaw”—that the article’s doctrinal arguments are unlikely 
to be adopted by courts because of the dispositive role that politics 
and ideology play in the interpretation of law.8
 
3
Id. at 1082. 
  In contrast, Professor 
4
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006). 
5
 See West-Faulcon, supra note 1, at 1091 (explaining that “the term ‘affirmative 
action’ appears nowhere in the[] text” of so-called anti–affirmative action laws and that 
“[a]ll told, state anti–affirmative action laws do not impose an absolute ban on race-
conscious action”).  
6
See West-Faulcon, supra note 1, at 1092 (noting that under the exception, anti–
affirmative action laws do not prohibit actions taken to become or remain eligible for 
federal funding, although public colleges and universities have not invoked it). 
7
Girardeau A. Spann, Response, Doctrinal Dilemma, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUM-
BRA 129, 129 (2009), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/12-2009/Spann.pdf. 
8
See id. at 132 (“The problem is not that Professor West-Faulcon’s doctrinal argu-
ment is in any way deficient.  The problem is that doctrine itself is typically unable to 
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Guy-Uriel Charles’s response to The River Runs Dry commends the ar-
ticle’s doctrinal arguments and its broader normative observations.9  
Professor Charles pointedly observes that by demonstrating that “legal 
tools are available for addressing the problem of racial inequality,”10 
my article raises a fundamental question:  “What, then, accounts for 
the failure of courts, specifically the Supreme Court, to take seriously 
the problem of racial inequality?”11
I agree with Professor Spann that broader critiques of racial exclu-
sion are essential to analyzing how state anti–affirmative action laws 
should and are likely be interpreted.  Also, I readily acknowledge, as 
Professor Spann observes, that I do not offer such a critique in The 
River Runs Dry.  As Professor Charles’s response recognizes, not only 
do I seek to end scholarly inattention to the actual doctrinal implica-
tions of anti–affirmative action laws, I use my doctrinal analysis to bol-
ster my claim that state anti–affirmative action laws are only partially 
to blame for the racial disparities in admissions to top-ranked public 
universities subsequent to the passage of such laws.  Through its em-
pirical and doctrinal analysis, my article seeks to reignite intellectual 
and political interest in considering whether universities required to 
comply with state anti–affirmative action laws are legally required to 
be “affirmative action-less.”  The responses of Professors Charles and 
Spann to The River Runs Dry are important and insightful examples of 
just such inquiry.
  Both responses offer valuable in-
sights with which I agree. 
12
Nevertheless, in this brief Reply, I focus on the conclusions 
reached by Professors Charles and Spann with which I disagree.  First, 
I address facts both professors seem to presume about the SAT’s ca-
 
 
overcome strongly motivated political opposition—especially with respect to the issue 
of race.”).  
9
See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Response, Do We Care Enough About Racial Inequality?  
Reflections on The River Runs Dry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 119, 125 (2009), 
http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/12-2009/Charles.pdf (acknowledging that 
the arguments in The River Runs Dry show that “the problem is not singularly legal” and 
instead reflect that little weight has been afforded to the dignity of minorities in consti-
tutional analysis). 
10
Id. 
11
Id. at 121. 
12
For example, Professor Charles relies on my analysis to conclude that racial in-
equality persists because “the Court is self-consciously making a choice, on the basis of 
variables other than ‘law.’”  Id. at 125-26.  Professor Charles asserts that the Court’s po-
litical analysis impedes its legal analysis:  in his view, the factors the Court considers in 
its constitutional analysis reflect a lack of “empathy [and] sympathy for the plight of 
people of color.”  Id. at 126.  Essentially, he argues that courts—particularly the cur-
rent U.S. Supreme Court—“do not care enough about racial inequality.”  Id. at 121.   
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pacity to identify the most qualified college applicants that can be le-
gitimately contested.  Second, I elaborate on my conclusion that state 
anti–affirmative action laws should be interpreted to permit a univer-
sity to adopt a remedial affirmative action policy if justified by sufficient 
evidence that race-consciousness in admissions is necessary to comply 
with Title VI disparate impact law.  Specifically, I challenge Professor 
Spann’s assertion that the holding in Ricci v. DeStefano13 undermines 
my article’s conclusion that state courts should import the strong-
basis-in-evidence standard developed under the Court’s Equal Protec-
tion jurisprudence to evaluate a university’s claim that it must consid-
er race to comply with Title VI federal civil rights law.14  Justice Ken-
nedy’s opinion in Ricci does not overtake my argument; it adopts a 
similar one in the employment context.15
I.  CARING ENOUGH ABOUT TEST DEFICIENCY 
 
One of the central observations that I make in The River Runs Dry 
is that selective public universities could diminish the large racial dis-
parities in admission rates that have been typical under affirmative ac-
tion-less policies without violating the legal dictates of state anti–
affirmative action laws.  Far from seeking to demonstrate that legal 
doctrine, in and of itself, has the capacity to ameliorate such racial 
disparities in admissions, my article’s central goal is to show that per-
ceptions about the predictive and sorting power of standardized col-
lege admissions tests greatly influences Title VI disparate impact anal-
 
13
129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).  This case, decided after the publication of The River 
Runs Dry, dealt with a “reverse discrimination” lawsuit filed by a predominantly white 
group of firefighters in New Haven, Connecticut.  
14
See Spann, supra note 7, at 135 (arguing that the Ricci decision has “overtaken” 
my argument for the strong-basis-in-evidence standard). 
15
Although the Ricci plaintiffs argued differently, the Ricci majority opinion ac-
cepts that New Haven’s consideration of race in deciding whether to use results of an 
employment test does not violate the disparate treatment provision of Title VII if the 
public employer has a strong-basis-in-evidence to fear disparate impact liability.  Where 
the four dissenters and Justice Kennedy disagree is whether “good cause” or “strong-
basis-in-evidence” is the appropriate evidentiary standard in such a circumstance.  In 
fact, based on Justice Ginsburg’s analysis, I would suggest that it is worth considering 
whether state courts should go further than I suggested in The River Runs Dry.  Perhaps 
state courts should interpret the federal funding provision to mean that an employer or 
university that demonstrates a “good cause” to fear disparate impact liability has demon-
strated that remedial race-consciousness would be consistent with the anti–discrimination 
requirement of state anti–affirmative action laws and would also be legally permissible 
race-consciousness because it “must be taken” to maintain Title VI federal funding. 
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ysis in this context.16  Essentially, The River Runs Dry questions the pre-
valent but insufficiently questioned view that the SAT is a master tool 
for differentiating between the best and the best of the best applicants to 
college.17
The facts in the Ricci firefighter promotion case (which both Pro-
fessor Charles and Professor Spann use as an example in their res-
ponses) parallel the scenario I consider in The River Runs Dry.  In my 
article, I consider the legality, under state anti–affirmative action law, 
of remedial race-consciousness undertaken by a university that legiti-
mately fears Title VI disparate impact liability because it cannot dem-
onstrate that its disproportionate rejection of the state’s most quali-
fied African American and Latino high school students is an 
educational necessity.  In an analogous manner in Ricci, the Court as-
sessed the legality, under federal employment discrimination law, of 
New Haven’s fear of Title VII disparate impact liability because it 
could not justify as business necessity its failure to promote the African 
American and Latino firefighters.
 
18  In The River Runs Dry, I assert that 
considering race in admissions is genuinely necessary—essential to 
maintaining Title VI federal funding—if a university has a strong basis 
in evidence to fear Title VI disparate impact liability even if it might 
be possible for the institution to avoid liability by some conceivably 
race-neutral means.19  Ricci applies the strong-basis-in-evidence stan-
dard to remedial race-conscious actions undertaken after an employer 
has administered an exam.20
My point in The River Runs Dry is that Title VI disparate impact law 
prohibits federally-funded universities from relying on differences in 
tests scores that do not correlate to real-world differences in student 
 
 
16
See West-Faulcon, supra note 1, at 1109-11 (defining and describing “test defi-
ciency” theories); see also West-Faulcon, More Intelligent Design:  Testing Measures of Merit, 
13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2010) (considering the legal implications of theo-
retical and predictive deficiencies of conventional standardized tests). 
17
Interestingly, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433 (1970), the Court 
characterized the opposite view as the “commonsense proposition” Congress intended 
to mandate under Title VII disparate impact law—that “tests are useful servants” but 
“they are not to become masters of reality.”  Id. 
18
See Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci:  White(ning) Discrim-
ination, Race-ing Test Fairness, 59 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 
tbl.1), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1507344 (showing the scores and racial 
identification of candidates passing the New Haven lieutenant test at issue in Ricci). 
19
 See West-Faulcon, supra note 1, at 1084. 
20
See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677 (“To succeed on their motion, then, petitioners must 
demonstrate that there can be no genuine dispute that there was no strong basis in 
evidence for the City to conclude it would face disparate-impact liability if it certified 
the examination results.”). 
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academic qualifications.  In the selective university and Ricci firefight-
er selection contexts, the issue is what happens when the decisonmak-
er becomes aware that a particular standardized test, although capable 
of screening out unqualified applicants, has limited capacity to diffe-
rentiate among high scorers.  Is race consciousness legal when a test 
user cannot prove that the predominantly white group of the highest 
of the high scorers on the test is truly the best of the best?  The key evi-
dentiary question becomes whether the scores on a particular stan-
dardized test are sufficiently precise measures such that it can be 
proved with a significant degree of scientific accuracy that applicants 
with higher test scores are the most qualified.  Had the Court ad-
dressed this question in the Ricci firefighter lawsuit, it would have 
asked:  Can a true scientific basis be established for concluding that 
firefighters with the lieutenant exam top-ten test scores—a group that 
included no African American firefighters—had better supervisory fire-
fighting skills than those who finished in the top sixteen, a group that 
included three African Americans?21
In contrast to less selective public universities that must sift 
through their applicant pool to weed out unqualified applicants, Pro-
fessor Spann is correct that the focus of highly selective universities is 
on identifying the best applicants.
   
22  In fact, because the standardized 
test scores and grade point averages of applicants to top-ranked col-
leges and universities have risen at such high rates over the past dec-
ades,23
 
21
See generally Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 
 I would go even further.  The nation’s most selective educa-
tional institutions are selecting the best of the best.  In contrast to less 
selective universities—institutions with pools of applicants with more 
mixed academic records, some weak and some strong—highly selec-
tive universities may find it difficult to prove that a particular standar-
dized test like the SAT can make fine distinctions among large groups 
of highly qualified applicants, pools of applicants almost all of which 
have very strong academic records. 
18 (arguing that the Court’s 
treatment in Ricci of city’s decision to disregard racially skewed employment test results 
as disparate treatment against white firefighters was inappropriate). 
22
See Spann, supra note 7, at 134 n.27 (reviewing my characterization of the dif-
ference between selectivity at prestigious private universities and public universities).  
23
See, e.g., WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER:  LONG-
TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 
29-30 (1998) (pointing out that competition for admission at selective schools has in-
creased dramatically, with SAT scores for both white and African American applicants 
continuing upward). 
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Whether courts will be convinced that universities have a strong-
basis-in-evidence or “good cause”24 to conclude that race-conscious 
admissions are necessary to comply with Title VI depends upon 
whether rejected nonwhite applicants, universities, courts, federal civil 
rights enforcement agencies, and legal scholars accept “the operating 
assumption . . . that large racial disparities in rates of admission to an 
affirmative action-less university need no explanation because they 
track racial disparities in SAT scores.”25
In my view, how legitimate it is for a university to fear losing fed-
eral funding due to the investigation or adjudication of a Title VI dis-
parate impact administrative complaint requires analysis of the capaci-
ties or deficiencies of the standardized test that institution uses for 
selection.  The lack of such “test deficiency” analysis explains the lack 
of legal and policy reaction to the racial disparities in admissions at 
selective public universities that has followed the passage of state anti–
affirmative action laws.  Even if state anti–affirmative action laws may 
be interpreted by state courts to permit remedial race-conscious ac-
tion to comply with Title VI disparate impact law, whether such action 
is taken will depend on universities’ assessments of the capacity of tests 
like the SAT to measure differences in applicants’ comparative aca-
demic “merit” and qualifications. 
 
II.  RELEVANCE OF THE NEW RICCI RULE 
The River Runs Dry posits that, in interpreting state anti–affirmative 
action laws, state courts should borrow the strong-basis-in-evidence 
standard from the Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence.  I argue 
that this will enable courts to evaluate the legality, under state law, of 
the actions of universities that voluntarily consider race in admissions 
in order to comply with Title VI disparate impact law.  A key aspect of 
my analysis in The River Runs Dry is its distinction between “diversity 
 
24
Four members of the Court concluded in Ricci that the less stringent “good 
cause” evidentiary standard is consistent with Title VII precedent in this area.  Ricci, 
129 S. Ct. at 2702 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  I do agree with Professors Charles and 
Spann that the Court’s strong-basis-in-evidence standard, particularly as applied in Ric-
ci, is an onerous one.  Again, this may mean that the “good cause” standard, as articu-
lated by Justice Ginsburg’s Ricci dissent, is an equally or more appropriate standard for 
state courts to adopt in evaluating remedial race-consciousness in admissions underta-
ken by universities to comply with Title VI disparate impact law.  
25
West-Faulcon, supra note 1, at 1103-04; see also id. at 1104 (“This presumption is 
so strong that the fact that the rate of admission of African American and Latino appli-
cants may be much lower than the rate of admission for applicants of other races is 
rarely discussed by commentators who accuse institutions of granting admissions pre-
ferences to minority applicants in violation of state anti–affirmative action law.”).  
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justified” affirmative action and remedial affirmative action.  To date, 
diversity-justified action is the type of race-consciousness that universi-
ties most often purport to use and it is the type that was recognized as 
constitutional by a five-Justice majority in Grutter v. Bollinger.26
As noted by Professor Charles, the Court’s ruling in Ricci arguably 
reinforces the analytical soundness of my article’s suggestion.
  My 
project is not considering whether state anti–affirmative action laws 
are likely to be interpreted by state courts to constitute complete bans 
on diversity-justified affirmative action.  Instead, its focus is the per-
missibility of a university’s remedial consideration of race under state 
anti–affirmative action laws. 
27  After 
Ricci, a public employer that refuses to base promotions on the results 
of an already-administered test because the employer thinks racial 
disparities are unjustified by “business necessity”—and thus violate 
Title VII—must have a “strong basis in evidence” for a race-conscious 
decision not to rely on the test results.  The rule articulated in Ricci28 
would be consistent with a state court’s use of the strong-basis-in-
evidence standard or even the less stringent good cause standard to 
evaluate university claims that race-consciousness in admissions is ne-
cessary to comply with Title VI.29
Professor Spann suggests that my interpretation of the federal 
funding exception to state affirmative action laws is less consistent 
with strict scrutiny than Professor Eugene Volokh’s interpretation of 
that provision
 
30 and that the Court’s decision in Ricci further supports 
Professor Volokh’s view.31
 
26
539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003)  
  This is an incorrect assessment for several 
reasons.  My point in The River Runs Dry is that the plain meaning of 
27
See Charles, supra note 9, at 125 (“Ricci . . . , as a theoretical matter, entertains 
the notion that state actors can take race into account (at least under Title VII) to mi-
nimize the racial impact of a standardized test . . . .”). 
28
Ricci’s holding was directed at compliance with Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–
2000e-17 (2006)—the federal civil rights statute upon which Title VI legal doctrine is 
based. 
29
Professor Charles made this point in his response by contrasting Justice Ro-
berts’s opinion in Parents Involved with Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Ricci.  See Charles, 
supra note 9, at 124-25 (arguing that the Ricci approach is preferable because it allows 
consideration of race to counter regulations with disparate impact). 
30
See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, The California Civil Rights Initiative:  An Interpretive 
Guide, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1386-87 (describing the federal funding exception as a 
tool to counter potential arguments that Proposition 209, the California Civil Rights 
Initiative, would cost California money). 
31
See Spann, supra note 7, at 135-36 (arguing that the Ricci standard is nearly im-
possible to satisfy). 
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the text of state anti–affirmative action laws, combined with their 
adoption history, explicitly permits remedial race-consciousness.32  
This permit is irrespective of what seems to be Professor Eugene Vo-
lokh’s conclusion—that race-consciousness is only permissible under 
such laws if “genuinely necessary” because no race-neutral action 
would preserve federal funding.33
Professor Volokh’s position is that state courts should interpret 
anti–affirmative action laws to impose what I would describe as 
“hyperstrict” scrutiny to any type of race-conscious action, whether 
remedial or diversity-justified.
   
34  While a significant number of the Jus-
tices on the current Court appear inclined to impose hyperstrict scru-
tiny to racial classifications, Justice O’Connor’s version of strict scruti-
ny—review that is not “fatal in fact”—remains the Court’s current 
constitutional rule.  This is evidenced by the fact that the University of 
Michigan Law School’s race-conscious admissions policy survived strict 
scrutiny in Grutter v. Bollinger35 and by Justice Kennedy’s suggestion in 
his concurring opinion in Parents Involved that certain types of non-
individualized race-consciousness would, in his view, survive strict 
scrutiny.36
As I explain in The River Runs Dry, the language of state anti–
affirmative action laws, which contain numerous exceptions allowing 
racially preferential treatment, does not support interpreting the fed-
eral funding exception as imposing a hyperstrict scrutiny standard of 
review.  The strong-basis-in-evidence standard and, perhaps, the good 
cause standard are sufficiently stringent to fulfill the antipreference 
goal of anti–affirmative action laws while remaining true to the antidi-
scrimination objectives of such laws.  The argument in favor of inter-
preting the federal funding exception as I suggest is that the text of 
state anti–affirmative action laws prohibits racially preferential treat-
  More significantly, the analytic framework introduced by 
The River Runs Dry that is missing from Professor Volokh’s analysis is 
recognition that despite the misnomer of “anti–affirmative action laws,” 
such laws are, in fact, antipreference and antidiscrimination  laws. 
 
32
See West-Faulcon, supra note 1, at 1157 (contrasting this view with Professor Vo-
lokh’s interpretation of the federal funding exception, which “should be rejected” giv-
en that “the text of the exception, if so interpreted, would have no practical effect”). 
33
See Volokh, supra note 30, at 1387 ( “If it’s possible to be eligible [for federal 
funds] without the discrimination, then the discrimination is prohibited . . . . [i]f the 
state can switch to a nondiscriminatory program that will still provide the federal 
funds, then the discriminatory conduct remains impermissible.”). 
34
Id. at 1386-87. 
35
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,, 343 (2003). 
36
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 790 
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).   
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ment, not all race-consciousness.  The River Runs Dry does not assert 
that Title VI requires federally funded universities to adopt remedial 
race-based affirmative action policies.  Instead, it makes the point that 
such policies remain permissible in states with anti–affirmative action 
laws if a university can meet the appropriate state law standard for 
demonstrating that the race consciousness is remedial rather than di-
versity-justified. 
While it is certainly true that the positions of Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justices Scalia and Thomas in Grutter 37 and of Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas in Parents Involved 38 in-
dicate that these Justices are intent on taking a Volokh-like approach 
to interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, Justice Kennedy’s opi-
nion in Ricci 39 stops short of imposing that new rule of hyperstrict 
scrutiny to all race-consciousness action in the interpretation of feder-
al civil rights statutes.40
The political discourse ultilized to convince voters to support or 
oppose state anti–affirmative action laws—particularly that surround-
  This is all the more reason my suggestion as to 
how state courts should review remedial affirmative action is superior 
to Professor Volokh’s.  The interpretation of anti–affirmative action 
laws most consistent with these laws’ dual prohibitions against racial 
preference and racial discrimination is one that applies a nonfatal 
standard of review to a public university’s proven need to engage in 
remedial race-consciousness.  The River Runs Dry asserts that anti–
affirmative action laws should be interpreted to permit a university to 
present evidence in support of a remedial need to adopt an affirma-
tive action policy. 
 
37
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 378-87 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
38
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 732. 
39
Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
40
 Although Professor Spann correctly concludes that the opinions of Chief Jus-
tice Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas seem to evidence an ideological 
goal to effectively ban the consideration of race to implement the goals of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.), see Spann, supra note 7, at 137 n.40, Justice Kennedy’s opinions 
in Parents Involved and Ricci decline to go as far as the rest of the anti–affirmative action 
block of the Court.  In Ricci, Justice Kennedy refused the plaintiffs’ invitation to strike 
down the disparate impact provision of Title VII as violating the Equal Protection 
Clause.  Or, to use the more violent metaphor offered by Justice Scalia in his concur-
ring opinion in Ricci, Justice Kennedy did not wage “the war” between the disparate 
impact provisions of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause that Justice Scalia views 
as inevitable.  Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2683 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
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ing the first such law, California Proposition 20941
Doctrinal arguments, as Professor Spann makes plain in his re-
sponse, are not all-powerful master tools.  But they do have value.  
State courts should interpret state anti–affirmative action laws accord-
ing to their actual language and overall meaning and not according to 
the anti–affirmative action political agenda of those who campaigned 
in favor of such laws.  That said, I agree with Professor Spann that “[i]t 
is also worth noting that even though the Supreme Court has used the 
strong-basis-in-evidence standard under strict scrutiny in some of its 
constitutional affirmative action race cases, the Court has never found 
that standard to be satisfied.”
—has been and is 
likely to continue to be rooted in ideological opposition to or support 
for affirmative action as a policy matter.  Yet my focus in this Reply is 
that, in interpreting an anti–affirmative action law after its passage, 
state courts need not—and in my view, should not—rely on anti–
affirmative action ideology.  It would be inconsistent with federal an-
tidiscrimination law and the antidiscrimination provisions of state an-
ti–affirmative action laws for state courts to treat remedial race con-
sciousness to avoid Title VI disparate impact liability as racially 
preferential treatment.  In addition, even if some state courts presume 
that anti–affirmative action laws prohibit diversity-justified affirmative 
action, such an assessment does not answer the question of how state 
courts should interpret the antipreference and federal funding provi-
sions of such laws as applied to race-conscious action undertaken by 
universities to comply with federal civil rights law. 
42  In addition to being a central reason 
that Professor Charles concludes that “courts do not care enough 
about racial inequality and the dignity of people of color,”43
CONCLUSION 
 the strin-
gency of the strong-basis-in-evidence standard might justifiably 
prompt some state courts to adopt a good cause evidentiary standard 
to implement the analytic framework I offer in The River Runs Dry. 
Professor Charles answers his own astute question of “why the 
Clinton and Obama Administrations have not forced public universi-
 
41
See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a) (“The state shall not discriminate against, or 
grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, 
ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, 
or public contracting.”).  Professor Volokh helped draft California Proposition 209.  
See VOLOKH, supra note 21, at 1387 (using the federal funding exception to mollify ar-
guments that Proposition 209 would have a large impact on the state treasury). 
42
Spann, supra note 7, at 135. 
43
Charles, supra note 9, at 121. 
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ties in anti–affirmative action states to justify the wide gap between 
admission rates of white applicants and applicants of color.”44
Finally, there is unquestionable value in taking seriously Professor 
Spann’s observations that “the Court’s personnel and the prevailing 
political climate” are likely to be more determinative in the Court’s 
analysis than doctrinal arguments, including the ones I make in The 
River Runs Dry.
  His an-
swer is that we do not care enough about racial inequality.  I would 
add another line of inquiry and potential explanation:  it is also possi-
ble that we do not care (or know) enough about the deficiencies or 
limitations of relying on test scores to select the best of a group of very 
qualified applicants. 
45  Yet Professor Charles says explicitly what Professor 
Spann ultimately acknowledges:  so long as the ideological underpin-
nings of courts’ doctrinal analyses are acknowledged to exist, legal 
scholarship must operate in dual domains—doctrinal and ideologi-
cal.46
 
  This is particularly true in an area made exponentially more 
doctrinally and ideologically complex by the emergence of state anti–
affirmative action laws. 
 
 
 Preferred Citation:  Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reply, Testing the Mas-
ter Tools, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 305 (2010), 
http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/05-2010/West-Faulcon.pdf. 
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Id. at 122. 
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Spann, supra note 7, at 138. 
46
See Charles, supra note 9, at 126 (arguing that “legal academics need to meet the 
challenge in the domain in which it is presented” by acknowledging the political di-
mensions of the debate). 
